Session 10 - ISNIE 2004

Saturday, October 2nd, 2004
3:15 – 4:45 p.m.
Five Parallel Sessions

Panel 10.1: GOVERNMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS

Chair: TBA
Discussants: Jeffery B. Nugent (University of Southern California) and Itai Sened (Washington University in St. Louis)

• International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999
  Witold J. Henisz (University of Pennsylvania), Bennet A. Zelner (Georgetown University) and Mauro F. Guillén (University of Pennsylvania)
• An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts
  Pablo T. Spiller (University of California – Berkeley)
• Regulatory Effectiveness: The Impact of Good Regulatory Governance on Electricity Industry Capacity and Efficiency in Developing Countries
  John Cubbin (City University-UK) and Jon Stern (London Business School)

Panel 10.2: GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS

Chair: John Wallis (University of Maryland)
Discussants: Troy Paredes (Washington University in St. Louis) and James Stewart (Reed College)

• Incentives in Corporations: Evidence from the American Whaling Industry
  Eric Hilt (Wellesley College)
• Credibility, Rules and Power in the European Union Institutions: A Transactions Analysis of the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’
  Abel Caballero, Gonzalo Caballero,  and Abel Losada (all of University of Vigo)
• The Global Farmer: Typology, Institutions, and Organization
  Kostas Karantininis (The Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University – Denmark) and Decio Zylbersztajn (University of Sao Paulo)

Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and Constitutional Change, 1842 – 1852
John Wallis (University of Maryland)

Panel 10.3: FIRM ORGANIZATIONS

Chair: Rosemarie Ziedonis (University of Michigan)
Discussants: Howard Shelanski (University of California at Berkeley) and Janet Bercovitz (Duke University)

• Ownership, Control and Performance in Swedish Listed Companies
  Per-Olof Bjuggren, Johan Eklund and Daniel Wiberg (all of Jonkoping International Business School)
• Technology Investment in Small Firms: A Transaction Cost Explanation
  Demian Castillo (University of the Americas)
• Inter-Firm Technological Spillovers Through Mobility of Scientists and the Organization of R&D
  Simona Lup (University of Arizona)

Panel 10.4: UNCERTAIN PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING

Organizer: Dean Williamson (U.S. Department of Justice)
Chair: Joanne E. Oxley (University of Toronto)
Discussants: Peter Klein (University of Missouri) and Arvids A. Ziedonis (University of Michigan)

• Incentives Verses Synergies in Markets for Talent
  Bharat Anand (Harvard University), Alexander Galetovic and Alvaro Stein (both of University of Chile)
• The Determinants of Success in R&D Alliances
  Jeffery H. Dyer (Brigham Young University), Benjamin C. Powell (University of Alabama), Mariko Sakakibara (University of California – Los Angeles), and Andrew J. Wang (National Institute of Standards and Technology)
• How Do Consortia Organize Collaborative R&D? Evidence From the National Cooperative Research Act
  Suzanne Majewski (Harvard University) and Dean Williamson (U.S. Department of Justice)
• Termination as Sole Remedy in Contracts
  Rachelle C. Sampson (New York University)

Panel 10.5: INSTITUTIONS, REFORM, AND DEVELOPMENT

Chair:  Kenneth Koford (University of Delaware)
Discussants: Sonja Opper (University of Tuebingen) and Alan Dye (Barnard College)

• Does foreign aid spur domestic investment and do recipients’ institutions matter?
  Eliana Balla (Washington University in St. Louis)
• The Ties That Bind: Political Institutions, Asset Specificity, and Economic Reform in Morocco and Jordan
  Bryan Ross Daves (Yeshiva University)
• Demand for Private Property Rights in Post-Soviet Russia: Causes and Effects in Manufacturing and Extractive Industries
  Anton Runov (State University-Higher School of Economics, Russia)
• Independent and Competing Institutions: An Effective Way to Control Government
  Mark Schelker (University of Fribourg) and Reiner Eichenberger (University of Fribourg)