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ISNIE 2005: The Institutions of Market Exchange

Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain
September 22-24, 2005

Thursday, September 22

Session I

Panel 1.1 Behavior

  • The Quality of Institutions: A Genetic Programming Approach
    Marcos Álvarez-Díaz (Columbia University) and Gonzalo Caballero (University of Vigo)
  • The Value of Information is a Question of Context: Some Institutional Implications of Ecological Rationality
    Nathan Berg (University of Texas)
  • Female Career Success: Institutions, Path Dependence and Psychology
    Magnus Henrekson and Anna Dreber (both of Stockholm School of Economics)
  • Work Ethics as a Prerequisite of Market Development: The Institutional Redesign of the Work Ethics in Austria During the 18th Century
    Peter Lewisch (Imade University)

Panel 1.2 Organizational Choice

  • Cooperatives as Systems of Attributes: A Study on China’s Farmer Specialized Cooperatives in the Fruit and Fresh Vegetable Industry
    Yamei Hu and George Hendrikse (both of Erasmus University-Rotterdam)
  • Optimal Governance Mechanisms of Land Use Decisions: A Property Rights Perspective
    Sung-Bae Kim (Soongsil University)
  • Firms, Nonprofits, and Cooperatives: The Role of Organizational Form in the Provision of Quality
    Jens Prüfer and Patrick Herbst (both of Goethe University-Frankfurt)
  • Entry Modes in Emerging Economics: The Case of the Water Industry
    Hugo Zarco-Jasso (IESE, University of Navarra)

Panel 1.3 History of Institutions

  • The Hacienda and its Institutional Content
    Fernando Buendia and Demian Castillo (both of University of the Americas)
  • Evolution of Financial Institutions: Iceland’s Path from Repression to Eruption
    Thrainn Eggertsson and Tryggvi Thór Herbertsson (both of University of Iceland)
  • The Influence of Chinese Market Reforms on the Revival of Guanxi and Chinese Economic Growth (1978-2002)
    Michel Ghertman (University of Nice and Xi’an Jiaotong University), Li Yuan (Xi’an Jiaotong University), and Nadine Tournois (University of Nice-Sophia-Antipolis)
  • Foreigners at the Shore: Path-dependency in the Chinese-Western Business Relations
    Xueyuan Zhang, Barbara Krug, and Patrick Reinmoeller (all of Erasmus University-Rotterdam)

Panel 1.4 Informality and Transaction Costs

  • Information Rules, Transaction Costs, and the Failure of the “Takings” Law in China
    Chenglin Liu (University of Houston)
  • The Institutions of the Market Economy: Business Start-Up Rules
    Hugh Spall (Central Washington University) and Laszlo Szerb (University of Pécs)
  • Measuring the Transaction Sector in the Polish Economy, 1996-2003
    Aleksander Sulejewicz and Patrycja Graca (both of Warsaw School of Economics)
  • Leasing the Street: Institutional Arrangements on Street Vendors’ Property Rights in Venezuela
    Wladimir Zanoni (CEDICE-Venezuela)

Session II

Panel 2.1 The Nature of Institutions: Habits, Conventions, and Rules

  • The Complex Evolution of a Simple Traffic Convention: The Functions and Implications of Habit
    Geoffrey Hodgson (University of Hertfordshire) and Thorbjoern Knudsen (University of Southern Denmark)
  • Rationality and Habituality Are Positively Correlated: What Does It Mean?
    Erkki Kilpinen (University of Helsinki)
  • On the Ontology of Money as an Institution
    Uskali Mäki (Erasmus University-Rotterdam)
  • The Psychology Behind Habitual Action
    Wendy Wood and David Neal (both of Duke University)

Panel 2.2 Incentives and Organizations

  • Locus of “Control” and “Crowding Out” Effect
    Pierre Garrouste and Maria Smirnova (both of University of Paris-ATOM Centre)
  • Shareholders Should Welcome Employees as Directors
    Margit Osterloh and Bruno Frey (both of University of Zurich)
  • Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships
    Konstantin Sonin (Institute for Advanced Study & New Economics School) and George Egorov (Centre for Economic and Financial Research)
  • Intrinsic Motivation and the Scope of the Firm
    Hagen Worch (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems)

Panel 2.3 Institutional History of Latin America

  • If Sharecropping is a Solution to Poverty, Why Were There Fewer Sharecroppers in Spain than in France in the 19th and 20th Century?
    Juan Carmona (Universidad Carlos III)
  • The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Cuban Revolution of 1933
    Alan Dye (Barnard College)
  • Rural Land Value, Credit Markets and Institutions in Frontier Development: The Case of the Pampas in the Early Argentine Agricultural Sector 1881-1895
    Andrés Gallo (University of North Florida)
  • Institutional Instability and Economic Growth in Argentina: A Long-Run View
    Leandro Prados de la Escosura (Universidad Carlos III) and Isabel Sanz-Villarroya (Universidad de Zaragoza)

Panel 2.4 Legal Origins vs. Legal Structure

  • Napoleon Code Versus Local Customs? Institutional Environment, Networks, and the Enforcement of Rural Labor Contracts in Mayotte
    Perrine Burnod and Jean-Philippe Colin (CIRAD/MUR MOISA)
  • The Rule of Law and Market Exchange: The Central Role of the Judiciary
    John Drobak and John Haley (both of Washington University in St. Louis)
  • Legal Structure and Labor Market Performance
    Horst Feldmann (University of Tubingen)
  • Bribery in Cross-border Small-scale Trading in the Balkans—Economic Interpretation of Social Capital and Embeddedness
    Henrik Egbert (University of Saarland)

Inaugural Session Keynote lecture:
The Role of Law in the Organization of the Firm
Henry Hansmann (Yale University)

Friday, September 23

Session III

Panel 3.1 Theoretical Insights

  • About a New Assumption in Coase’s 1960 Article: The “Coase Theorem” Needs an Institution
    Elodie Bertrand (University of Littoral Cote d'Opale, LEMMA)
  • The New Institutional Economics: Its Start, Its Meaning, Its Prospects
    Rudolph Richter (University of Saarland)
  • Business History and the Economics of Organization: The Governance Perspective
    Oliver Williamson (University of California-Berkeley)
  • Measuring Costs and Transaction Costs Perspectives of the Firm: Two Views About the Same Subject
    Decio Zylbersztajn (University of Sao Paulo)

Panel 3.2 Make, Buy, or Hybrid?

  • A Transaction Cost Analysis of Ownership Structure Changes: Implications to the Future Role of Cooperatives in U.S. Agriculture
    Fabio Chaddad (IBMEC Business School-Sao Paulo) and Michael Cook (University of Missouri- Columbia)
  • The Allocation of Development Aid: Evidence from Spain
    Jennifer Kuan and Natalia Cruz (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research/University of Valladolid)
  • Designing Firm Boundaries: From “Make-Buy-or-Ally” to the Dynamic Benefits of Vertical Architectures
    Michael G. Jacobides and Stephan Billinger (both of London Business School)
  • Alliance Announcements and the Abnormal Returns Experienced by the Allying Firms’ Rivals
    Brian S. Silverman and Joanne E. Oxley (both of University of Toronto)

Panel 3.3 Evolution of Market Institutions

  • Development, Transaction Costs, and Higher Education Preferences
    Rafael Barroso (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)
  • Competition, Knowledge, and Institutions
    Wolfgang Kerber (Philipps-University Marburg)
  • The Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model
    Chris Mantzavinos (Witten/Herdecke University)
  • The Institutional Economics of Human Biological Materials: Market Exchange and Biomedical Collection and Research
    Margaret Polski (Indiana University)

Panel 3.4 Regulation

  • The Effect of Regulatory Announcements on Daily Stock Returns in the German Telecommunication Market: Evidence from an Event-Study Approach
    Thomas Ehrmann, Mark Mietzner, and Alexander Suermann (all of Muenster University)
  • Deregulation Policy and Regulatory Governance: A Neo-Institutional Perspective
    Bertrand Quelin and Delphine Riccardi (both of HEC School of Management)
  • Real Options to Privatize a Utility in India
    Joel Ruet (Centre de Sciences Humaines)
  • Institutions and Biotechnology: Building an Efficient Regulatory Framework
    José Maria da Silveira, Maria Ester Dal Poz, and Izaias de Carvalho Borges (all of University of Campinas)

Panel 3.5 Multilateral Institutions

  • The Perspectives of Common Policies in an Increasing Heterogeneous European Union
    Joachim Ahrens, Renate Ohr, and Götz Zeddies (all of European Business School)
  • Institutionalization in the Management of International Waters: The Role of Problem Structure
    Ines Dombrowsky (UFZ Centre for Environmental Research Leipzig)
  • IMF in Theory: Sovereign Debts, Judicialization and Multilateralism
    Jerome Sgard (CEPII, University of Paris-Dauphine)
  • Membership Has its Privileges: On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally
    Stefan Voigt (University of Kassel)

Session IV

Panel 4.1 Experiments and Institutions

  • The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps
    C. Mónica Capra (Emory University), Colin Camerer, Lauren Munyan (both of California Institute of Technology), Charles Noussair (Emory University), Veronica Sovero, Tomomi Tanaka, and Lisa Wang (all of California Institute of Technology)
  • Dividing Up the Benefits of Cooperation: An Experiment
    Marco Casari and Tim Cason (both of Purdue University)
  • On the Evolvement of the Institution Choice in Social Dilemmas
    Özgür Gürerk, Bettina Rockenbach (both of University of Erfurt), and Bernd Irlenbusch (London School of Economics)
  • Either All or No One: The Signing of Cooperation Agreements in Public Goods Experiments
    Michael Kosfeld (University of Zurich), Akira Okada (Hitotsubashi University Tokyo) and Arno Riedl (University of Maastricht)

Panel 4.2 Vertical Integration

  • Specialization, Entry, and Technology Choice in Networks
    Alain Bourdeau de Fontenay and Christiaan Hogendorn (both of Columbia University)
  • Ownership and Internalization of Investment Benefits in Small Firms: Transaction Costs and Strategy
    Demian Castillo and Fernando Buendía (both of University of the Americas)
  • Vertical Re-integration (“one-stop-shop”) as New Market Creation: How Firms Actively Re-Shaped Their Institutional Environment in the Construction Sector
    Michael G. Jacobides and Eugenia Cacciatori (both of University of London-London Business School)
  • Managed Care and A Process of Vertical Integration in the Health Care Sector: A Case Study of Poland
    Katarzyna Kowalska (Warsaw University)

Panel 4.3 The Law and Economics of Hybrid Forms

  • Effects of Prior Relationships on Contract Structure Between Corporate Sponsors and Academic Researchers
    Janet Bercovitz and Beverly Tyler (Duke University)
  • Interlocking Transactions: Do They Restrain the Emergence of Producers’ Associations?
    Jean-Marie Codron, M’hand Fares, and Sylvaine Lemeilleur (all of MOISA)
  • The Organizational Arrangement between Vittel and Farmers: An Application of TCE’s Framework to Environmental-related Transactions
    Gilles Grolleau, Naoufel Mzoughi (both of UMR INRA-ENESAD CESAER) and Christopher Déprés (University of Burgundy and UMR INRA-ENESAD)
  • Transaction Costs, Contagion Effects, and the Diffusion of the Uniform Sales Act, 1906-47
    Donald J. Smythe (Washington and Lee University)

Panel 4.4 Regulation of Product Quality

  • From Public to Private Safety Regulation? The Case of Negotiated Agreements in the French Fresh Produce Import Industry
    Jean-Marie Codron, M’hand Fares, and Elodie Rouvière (all of MOISA)
  • The Effectiveness of Voluntary Agreements to Improve Environmental Quality: Symbolic Versus Substantive Collaboration
    Magali Delmas and Maria Montes-Sancho (both of University of California-Santa Barbara)
  • Why Did Canada Nationalize Liquor Sales in the 1920s? A Political Economy Model
    Ruth Dupre and Desire Vencatachellum (both of HEC Montreal)
  • Quality Regulation and the Creation of a Private Market for Certification: Institutional Design and Regulatory Issues in Agro-Food Sectors
    Armelle Maze (INRA and SADAPT)

Panel 4.5 Political Parties and Participation

  • An Economic Analysis of the Reporter’s Privilege in Civil Defamation Cases
    Ido Baum (University of Hamburg)
  • Party Competition and Learning in a Complex Environment: Do Politicians Learn Good Economic Policy?
    Ivo Bischoff (University of Giessen)
  • Informed Political Decisions through Cognitive Shortcuts
    Francois Montagne (College Thomas More)
  • North, the Institutional Matrix and Actor Uncertainty Assessment: Evidence from Government and Business Interaction in Japan
    Peter von Staden (University of The West of England)

Plenary Session Presidential Address:
The Problem of Water
Gary Libecap (President of ISNIE)

Session V

Panel 5.1 Panel Discussion on “Challenges and New Directions in NIE”

Panel 5.2 Network Industries

  • Do Grandfather Rights Reduce Transaction Costs Inside Airline Networks?
    Hans Huber (EPFL) and Renaud Mouyrin (CEROG)
  • The Transaction Costs and Mutual Forbearance Strategies of European Airlines
    Renaud Mouyrin (CEROG) and Michel Ghertman (University of Nice and Xi’an Jianotong University)
  • Political Hazards, Opportunism, and the Stock Market Reaction to the International Expansion of Telecom Firms
    Pablo Sánchez-Lorda and Esteban García-Canal (both of University of Oviedo)
  • Telecommunications Policies: Measurement and Determinants
    Francesc Trillas (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) and Jordi Gual (IESE-Barcelona)

Panel 5.3 The Dynamics of Property Rights

  • The Effects of Tenancy on Rural Production: The Case of Argentina 1994-2002
    Lee Alston and Andres Gallo (University of Colorado-Boulder)
  • The Impact of Women’s Schooling on Property Rights and Decision Making within the Household: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Sudan
    Buthaina Ahmed Elnaiem (Juba University)
  • Institutions and Organizational Entrepreneurship: the Case of New Generation Cooperatives
    Peter G. Klein, Michael Cook, and Molly Chambers (all of University of Missouri-Columbia)
  • IP Law and Antitrust Law Complementarity: When Property Rights are Incomplete
    Antonio Nicita, Matteo Rizzolli, and Maria Alessandra Rossi (all of University of Siena)

Panel 5.4 Institutional Design of Lawmaking

  • Rational Contracting under Objective Reasonableness
    Bruce Chapman (University of Toronto, Faculty of Law)
  • A Transactions Cost Justification for the Fee Tail
    Jonathan Klick (Florida State University)
  • The Expressive Power of Adjudication
    Richard McAdams (University of Illinois College of Law)
  • Legislation and Countervailing Effects from Social Norms
    Georg von Wangenheim (University of Kassel) and Francesco Parisi (George Mason University)

Panel 5.5 Politics and Institutional Change

  • Making Participation in Water Resources Management Work
    Regina Birner (International Food Policy Research Institute) and Heidi Wittmer (Center for Environmental Research)
  • Revenue and the Character of the State
    Scott Gehlbach (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
  • Effects of Political Competition on Horizontal Accountability: The Case of the Independent Courts of Accounts in the Brazilian States
    Marcus Andre Melo, Carlos Mauricio Figueiredo, and Carlos Pereira (all of Federal University of Pernambuco)
  • Learning and Informal Institutions: Institutional Change via Alternative Politics in Israel
    Shlomo Mizrahi (Ben-Gurion University)

Session VI

Panel 6.1 Methodology

  • Weberian Bureaucracy and the Corporation in the Global Economy
    Victor Nee (Cornell University) and Sonja Opper (Lund University)
  • Analyzing Institutions: What Methods to Apply?
    Martina Padmanabhan and Volker Beckmann (both of Humboldt University-Berlin)
  • The Failure of Market Failure
    Richard Zerbe and Howard E. McCurdy (both of University of Washington)

Panel 6.2 Franchising

  • Governance Inseparability in Franchising: Evidences from Case Studies in France and Brazil
    Paulo Azevedo and Vivian Silva (both of Sao Paulo School of Economics)
  • Incentives and Control in Company-Owned vs. Franchised Outlets: An Empirical Study at the Chain Level
    Didier Chaubaud (University of Paris-ATOM Centre) and Stéphane Saussier (ADIS, University of Paris II & ATOM)
  • Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies, Physical Assets Valuation at Contract’s Renewal and Incentive to Invest: The Case of the Water Sector in France
    Eshien Chong and Freddy Huet (both of University of Paris)
  • The Effectiveness of Contractual Self-Enforcement and Implications for the Governance Structure of Franchising Firms
    Olivier Cochet and Thomas Ehrmann (both of University of Muenster)

Panel 6.3 Property Rights and Natural Resources

  • Who Forms Local Institutions? Levels of Household Participation in India’s Joint Forest Management Program
    Bhagirath Behera and Stefanie Engel (both of University of Bonn)
  • The Non-Tragedy Of The Buffalo Commons
    P.J. Hill (Wheaton College / PERC)
  • Economic Organization and the Game Department
    Dean Lueck and Dominic Parker (both of University of Arizona)
  • Barriers to Water Markets in Heihe River Basin in Northwest China
    Junlian Zhang (China Agricultural University)

Panel 6.4 Comparative Criminal Justice Institutions

  • Law and Economics of Plea-Bargaining
    Nuno Garoupa (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
  • The Enforcement of Spanish Antitrust Law: A Critical Assessment of the Fine Setting Policy of the Legal Framework for Private Enforcement
    Francisco Marcos (Instituto de Empresa)
  • Beyond Principle: Comparative Institutional Analysis and the Future of the Rehabilitative Ideal
    Íñigo Ortiz de Urbina (Pompeu Fabra University)
  • Incentives and Criminal Defense Lawyers: An Event Study
    Frank Stephen (University of Manchester)

Panel 6.5 Political Institutions in a Changing World

  • Political Institutions, Competing Principals, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting
    John Carey (Dartmouth College)
  • The Institutionalization of Political Parties and the Quality of Public Policy
    Philip Keefer (The World Bank)
  • Can Aid Reform Institutions?
    Mary Shirley (Ronald Coase Institute)
  • Inequality and the Evolution of Institutions of Taxation: Evidence from the Economic History of the Americas
    Kenneth L. Sokoloff and Eric M. Zolt (both of University of California-Los Angeles)

Plenary Session Keynote Lecture:
Social Preferences and Institutional Design
Ernst Fehr (University of Zurich)

Saturday, September 24

Session VII

Panel 7.1 Culture and Behavior

  • Religious Signaling and the Evolution of Altruism
    Wolfgang Pfeuffer (University of Munich)
  • Towards an Evolutionary Model of Economic Growth and Wellbeing
    Charlotte Phelps (Temple University)
  • Culture Shock and Economic Outcomes
    Leslie Kathleen Williams (California State University)
  • Effects of National Culture on Economic Creativity and Innovation
    Leslie Kathleen Williams and Stephen J. J. McGuire (both of California State University)

Panel 7.2 Opening the Black Box of the Firm

  • The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics: A Stocktaking and Assessment
    Nicolai Foss (Copenhagen Business School) and Peter Klein (University of Missouri-Columbia)
  • An Envy Theory of the Firm
    Jackson Nickerson (Washington University in St. Louis)
  • The Effects of Corporate Visibility on Executive Pay: A Test of the Implicit Regulation Hypothesis
    Bruce A. Rayton, Stephen Brammer, and Suwina Cheng (all of University of Bath)
  • Control Mechanisms on the Shop Floor: An Integrative Framework of Efficiency Concerns, Power Asymmetries, and Interactions
    Xosé H. Vázquez (University of Vigo)

Panel 7.3 Organizing Exchange Without Law

  • Contractual Design and Extra Contractual Devices: The Case of Infrastructure Concession Contracts
    Laure Athias and Stéphane Saussier (ADIS, University of Paris 11 & ATOM)
  • Contractual Responses to Institutional Changes: from Debt to Equity in Late Medieval Venice
    Yadira González de Lara (University of Alicante)
  • Resolutions, Recoveries, and Relationships: The Evolution of Payment Disputes in Central and Eastern Europe
    William Pyle (Middlebury College)
  • Mobilizing Investment in Lawless Environments: Economic Depression and the Maritime Trade of Venetian Crete 1303-1400
    Dean Williamson (US Department of Justice)

Panel 7.4 Public and Private Interactions in the Provision of Market Infrastructures

  • Public and Private Interactions in the Regulation of Information Industries
    Eric Brousseau (EconomiX, University of Paris X, and IUF)
  • Auctions, Ex Post Competition and Prices: The Efficiency of Public-Private Partnerships
    Eshien Chong (ADIS, University of Paris 11 and ATOM), Freddy Huet (ATOM, University of Paris I-Sorbonne) and Stéphane Saussier (ADIS, University of Paris 11, and ATOM)
  • Creating Institutional Foundations Which Make Retail Markets Work: The Case of the Electrical Industry
    Jean-Michel Glachant (ADIS-GRJM, University of Paris)
  • The Diversity of Quality Enforcement in Devices and their Interactions
    Manuel González-Díaz (University of Oviedo) and Emmanuel Raynaud (INRA and SADAPT)
  • Towards a Theory of Incomplete Property Rights: The Role of Public and Private Institutions in Defining Property Rights
    Antonio Nicita, Matteo Rizzolli, and Alessandra Rossi (all of University of Siena)

Session VIII

Panel 8.1 Trust and Fairness

  • Fairness and Pressure Group Competition
    Fridrik M. Baldursson (University of Iceland)
  • A Theory of Trust Based on Systems of Intermediation
    Marina Della Giusta (Reading University Business School)
  • The Importance of Reference Groups and Decision-Rules for Trust
    Håkan Holm (Lund University)
  • Fairness in Urban Land Use
    Christian Schubert (Max Planck Institute for Research Into Economic Systems)

Panel 8.2 Marketing

  • Am Empirical Investigation of Leasing Versus Selling as Governance Devices in Industrial Equipment Markets
    Mrinal Ghosh (University of Michigan)
  • An Empirical Study of Restricted Rights in Technology License Contracts
    Chae Un Lim, Stephen Carson, Mrinal Ghosh (all of University of Michigan), and George John (University of Minnesota)
  • Separating Efficiency and Strategic Effects in Marketing Channels: Marrying NEIO Methods to NIE Concerns
    Om Narashiman, Xinlei Chen, and George John (all of University of Minnesota)
  • Estimating the Costs of Mistaken Compensation Plans
    Raghunath Rao (University of Minnesota)

Panel 8.3 Hold-Up and Contract Adjustment

  • Endogenous Enforcement, Hold-Up Risk and Investment Flexibility
    Esteban Hnylicza (University of San Martin de Porres)
  • Relational Contracts and Comparative Efficiency in the Supply of Specialty Coffee in Brazil
    Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes (University of Sao Paulo)
  • Long-Term Contracts for Natural Gas Supply – An Empirical Analysis of the Changing Nature of Pipeline and LNG Contracts
    Anne Neumann (Dresden University of Technology)
  • Why Partnering When you Have a “Complete” Contract?
    Johann Nystrom (Royal Institute of Technology)

Panel 8.4 Law and NIE

  • Freedom of Speech, the Market for Ideas and the Issue of Ownership and Concentration in the Newspaper Sector
    Per-Olof Bjuggren and Helena Bohman (Jonkoping International Business School)
  • The Choice of Civil Dispute Resolution: Trial vs. Arbitration vs. Mediation
    John Drobak and Karen Tokarz (Washington University School of Law)
  • How Legal Institutions Affect Firm Structure and Market Exchanges by Shaping Knowledge Transactions: The Influence of Restrictive Covenants and Stock Options on High Tech Firms
    Erica Gorga (Fundacao Getulio Vargas Law School) and Michael Halberstam (Emory Law School)
  • Social Network Transacting versus Judicial Systems: An Obstacle to Development?
    Robert M. Sherwood (Consultant)

Session IX

Panel 9.1 Social Structures in Cyberspace: The Design and Function of Digital Institutions

  • Social Physics: Peer-to-Peer Platforms for the Formation and Governance of Digital Self-Organizing Social Networks
    John Clippinger (Harvard Law School)
  • Internet and Society: The Technologies and Politics of Control
    Urs Gasser (Harvard Law School)
  • Delivering Institutions Via the Web: Opportunities and Challenges
    Oliver R. Goodenough (Vermont Law School and Gruter Institute)
  • Contracts, Business Organizations, and Other Private Economic Institutions in a Digital World
    Linda Smiddy (Vermont Law School)

Panel 9.2 Procurement and Public Services

  • Dealing with Incentives and Institutions in Prison Management
    Sandro Cabral (Federal University of Bahia) and Paulo Azevedo (Sao Paulo School of Economics)
  • Electronic Purchase Systems in the Public Sector: The BEC/SP Model
    Milton de Abreu Campanario, Marcello Silva, and Tiago Ribeiro (all of University of Sao Paulo)
  • Yardstick Competition, Franchise Bidding, and Collusion
    Eshien Chong and Freddy Huet (both of University of Paris)
  • Risk-Allocation: Theoretical and Empirical Evidences: Application to Public-Private Partnerships in the Defense Sector
    Jean-Michel Oudot (University of Paris I)

Panel 9.3 Contract Choice

  • The Issue of Contractual Choice in a Transition Economy: Reverse Tenancy in Romania
    L. Amblard and J. Ph. Colin (both of UMR MOISA)
  • Multiple Labor Contracting Responses Within One Organization
    Andre Sammartino and Andrew Seltzer (University of Melbourne)
  • Egalitarianism and International Investment
    Jordan I. Siegel (Harvard University Business School), Amir N. Licht (Interdisciplinary Center-Herzliya), and Shalom H. Schwartz (Hebrew University-Jerusalem)
  • Ownership, Contractual Practices, and Technical Efficiency: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France
    Anne Yvrande-Billon and William Roy (both of University of Paris-ATOM Centre)

Panel 9.4 Agriculture

  • Climbing the Agricultural Ladder: Horation Alger and Having the Right Parents
    Lee Alston and Joseph Ferrie (both of University of Colorado-Boulder)
  • Understanding Agricultural Land Markets: Insights From New Institutional Economics and New Economic Sociology
    Annette Hurrelmann (Humboldt University of Berlin)
  • Reducing Appropriate Quasi Rents to Combat the Hold-Up Problem in Contract Agriculture
    Kostas Karantininis and Jesper Graversen (both of The Royal Veterinary & Agricultura University)
  • Simulating Potential Benefits of Collective Action Amongst Farmers Producing Pepper for a Monopsonic Buyer in Costa Rica
    Fernando Saenz (National University), Marijke D’Haese, Rob Schipper, and Ruerd Ruben (all of Wageningen University)

Session X

Panel 10.1 Cross-Country Studies

  • Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets, and Bankruptcy
    Christa Hainz (University of Munich)
  • The Country-Specific Institutional Structure of Production, Scope and Success in Foreign Expansion
    Michael G. Jacobides (University of London-London Business School)
  • Sovereign Risk: Constitutions Rule
    Emanuel Kohlscheen (University of Warwick)
  • Between Two Evils: Investors Prefer Grand Corruption!
    Johann Graf Lambsdorff (University of Passau) and Utku Teksoz (University of Munich and the Office of the Chief Economist, EBRD)

Panel 10.2 Utilities Contracting

  • Regulation of the Network Industries: An Evaluation of the European Model
    Matthias Finger (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)
  • The Credibility of Hybrid Governance Structures of Sectoral Policy in Different Institutional Environments: The Case of Promotion of Renewables
    Dominique Finon (CIRED, CNRS) and Yannick Perez (University of Paris)
  • Designing Market Institutions: The Case of Ownership Unbundling in the Dutch Electricity Sector
    John Groenewegen (Erasmus University-Rotterdam)
  • Long Term Contracts for Gas Imports – A European Perspective
    Christian von Hirschhausen and Karsten Neuhoff (both of DIW-Berlin University of Technology)

Panel 10.3 Adapting Contracts to Law

  • Conflict, Wages, and Multiple Equilibria
    Veneta Andonova and Hernando Zuleta (both of ITAM)
  • Diversity of Employment Contracts and Use of the Law: The Case of the French Labour Market
    Christian Bessy (Center of Employment Studies)
  • A Game Theoretic Model of Intra-Community and Inter-Community Transaction Rules in a Collectivist World Without Third Party Enforcement
    Ke-young Chu (Kyung Hee University)
  • What’s in a Name? The Legal Status of Agricultural Production Contracts
    Michael Sykuta and Harriet F. Francis (both of University of Missouri-Columbia)

Panel 10.4 Finance and Financial Institutions

  • Fiscal Reform and Federal Relations
    Basilia Aguirre and Guilherme Dias (both of University of Sao Paulo)
  • An Empirical Contribution to the Soft Budget Constraint Analysis: Solving Incentive Problems in Transition
    Céline Bignebat and Fabian Gouret (both of MOISA and INRA)
  • What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm
    Doris Neuberger (University of Rostock)
  • Fiscal Decentralization: Efficiency vs. Redistribution? An Institutional Feature to Resolve the Trade-Off
    Mark Schelker (University of Fribourg)